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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D,, Montana)
For Release A. M. 's, Tuesday, June 11, 1957

TH 'DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Department of State should be our first hne of defense.

The

State Department should be t!le primary instrucment of the Executive for advancing the forei,:n relations of the Ur.ited States,

It has long been acceptP-d

by both political parties th· t the United States can speak w:.th only one voice
in the conduct of foreign relations.

Notwithstanding the inherent responsibility

of the State DepartmentD as our interests abroad have expanded, an organizationa! structure has mush roomed permite.ng the United States to speak with
many contradictory v ·ices.

The State Department has become partially para-

lyzed in the exercise of its responsibility.

It has become crippled as the

autonomous agencies have circumvented its control in conducting foreign relations.

:n particular, the United States Information Agency and the

!nterna~ional

Cooperation Administration are powerful autonomous instruments of United
States fo ::- eign relations.
While it is regrettable that these agencies daily shape the course
o i our foreign relations without the benefit of close State Department direction,

it is more to be regretted tha t the Secretary of State is a foremost advocate
of this dualism.
The position taken by the Secretary of State on numerous occasions
hr:.G b:xn that these foreign operation functions of the United States government

cannot be incorporated within t!le State Department.

The reason advanced is

thfl.t the Department would then not be free to engage in policy-making.
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The

- 2. Secretary of State is not alone is this mistaken view.

It may be granted that

policy making is an important aspect of our foreign relations.

There must

be United States representation in the United Nations and in the World's
capitols.

There is a continuing need for high-level consultation, negotia-

tion, coordination of State interests, and treaty making.

But this historical

picture of diplomacy does not entirely satisfy the present needs of United
States foreign relations.
With the growth of economic and m:litary

strength and political

leadership, the responsibilities of the United States have expanded proportionForeign relations is no longer solely a matter of representation and
involves
treaty making, but/the entire range of our global operations. Foreign

ately.

policy is no longer something that can be coined exclus ively within cloistered
walls.

For while the State Department is conceiving policy, actual policy

is also being made by the operations of the quasi-independent agencies
negotiating daily with foreign governments -- dailycil.etermining the course
of our foreign relations.
operations.

A sharp line cannot be drawn between policy and

Operational activities of the agencies are not distinct from

policy, but are rather the life and breath of foreign policy.
At present the agencies have separate headquarters in Washington and separate establishments in the field.

In Washington, the theoreti-

cal organizational chart provides for top-level policy coordination by the
Department of State.

In practice, the policy is either lost in the course

of implementation or the policy is simply a rubber-stamping of what has
become a defacto decision of the agency.

In the field, in theory, the agency

-
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is under the umbrella of the ambassador.
ports to its headquarters in Washington.

In practice: the field agency reUnder present organization it is

virtually imposs:ble for the S-::ate Department to initiate and control policies
in Washington or for the a.c.obas sailors to control policy in the field.
Mr. President, were this a mere question of internal

organ5. z::~.ti on

only o£ concern to the Administration, we would not burden the Senate,

it is,

however, a matter o:f conc ern to the Senate, affecting as it does the course of
United States foreign relations,

1.
the State

We may enumerate the specific consequences ;

In the absence of continuing and direct supervision by

Department~

the c.gencies tend to mushroom their activities 0 often.

engaging in projects or programs not directly related to the key foreign policy
objectives in the area.
2.

The activities of the agencies often work at counter-

purposes to other agencies or to the Department of State,
3.
results in the

The present practice of multi-agency operations abroad
11

snowballing" of Arne ric an personnel.

A point is reached at

which the presence of large numbers of Americans in a country works more
against our interests than the program works to our interest.
familiar pattern,

It is the

As the contingent increases in size, it is accompanied by the

Post Exchange, American automobiles, American salaries, American high
schools, American standards of living, and inevitably local animosity and
fdction.
4.

The lack of central unified operations within the State

Department makes for a duplication of administrative functions and tends to

- 4 build up excessive housekeeping services and personnel,
inefficiency

u.

our program.

.c.l waste, boosting the cost and lowering tb.e effectivenes s of

Qua.Ety is sacrificed to quantity.

problems growing out of
amon~

This m akes for

di J ~ a :ci:y

It incurs administrative

in salaries, emoluments, and service s

pe:::-sonnel of the separate agencies.
5.

position.

It places the United States ambassador in an untenable

While the ambassador waits to negotiate high policy, the minor

officials of the agencies maintain daily contact with the officials of the
country.

This is often at the Permanent Secretary or Ministerial level.

These contacts give continuing shape to United States foreign policy.

If

there is a serious question at issue, the agency refers tt back for decision to a
desk officer in his agency in Washington.

The desk officer of the U . S.

Information Agency or the International Cooperation Administration in Washington then makes a decision and United States policy is made.

Ordinarily,

this desk officer knows a great deal about the particular problems of his
area, but is not expected to know the broader implicat ions of total Unit e d
States foreign policy.

Yet this desk officer makes the day-to-day policy

cutting the ground from under the State Department in Washington and leaving the ambassador in an awkward position.
is a ceremonial totem pole .

In this role, the ambassador

The officials of the country look to the minor

agency officials as the source of the living, real, dynamic day-to-day policy.
The ambassador spends considerable time trying to catch up and cover up
the operations of these minor agency officials.

While the ambassador's

economic affairs officer, public information officer or political affairs

- 5 officer -- the regular foreign service personnel -- are transmitting cables to
Washington formulating high policy, the agency personnel are already way
ahead implementing either that policy or its diametric opposite,
it is the opposite,

Too often

Tragic as it may seem, in too many instances the focus

of real power of the United States under this system is not the ambassador
but the agency head,

The agency head too often not only has the monopoly

of decision upon the concrete issues, but has an edge on the emoluments of
prestige and power.

In some instances the agency heads even have had larger

villas, more expensive automobiles and more lavish representation allowances
than the ambassador,

In his recent testimony before the Senate Appropriations

Committee the Director of the U. S, Information Agency characterized integration within the State Department as the "tail wagging the dog."

The present

status of the State Department is fairly clear.
6,

There is yet another aspect too often overlooked,

During

the post- war period these quasi-independent agencies have been established
to meet the United States 1 world-wide responsibilities believed to be of an
emergency or temporary nature.

The economic collapse of Europe, the

resurgence of militant communism, the cold war, the Korean War and its
aftermath all have called for large-scale United States operations abroad.
To the extent that these have been massive operations and to the extent that
they have been conceived as non-recurrent measures, there has been some
just ification for the autonomous agency.

We now are faced, however, with a

new premise -- a new point of departure calling for a changed outlook.

That

is what appears to be the evident truth that while some programs may be

- 6 phased out at an early date, other operations of the United States abroad
are of such nature as to continue beyond the foreseeable future,
this, two conditions are evident: First, the e?O stence

Recognizing

of the autonomous

agency tends to perpetuate those functions which could be phased-out at an
early date.

Secondly, those remaining non-military functions that are

recognizably of a permanent nature should be established on a permanent
basis within a permanent department of the government,

It would appear

that the total overseas personnel establishment could then be greatly reduced.

Programs could then be administered by career personnel on a

sound business -like basis,

Above all, they should be closely geared to all

other foreign operations of the United States and they should be administered
in close harmony with United States foreign policy objectives,

These condi-

tions can only be met by incorporating the present autonomous agencies
within the Department of State,

Only by establishing the organization on a

permanent basis will it be possible to phase out those programs that are not
of a permanent nature,
Ironic as it may seem, one important consequence of the State
Department's loss of control over many of the most important instruments
of foreign policy is that the State Department must take the blame for the
mistakes of the other agencies of government operating abroad.

If the

Voice of America makes a mistake damaging to our relations with a country
or an area, who takes the blame? If the Department of Defense makes a mistake in its activities abroad, who takes the blame? If the International Cooperation Administration approves a grant to a country when it could have
obtained a loan from the Export-Import Bank, who takes the blame?

-
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In each case, it is the Department of State which takes the blame
both in the eyes of foreign nations and in the eyes of our own citizens,
Power and respor.sibility must be inextricably linked together for
the efficient conduct of the £oreign c:.f:fairs of this nation.

That is not now the

case,
One other illustration.

The CommHtee on Foreign Relations has

recently gone through the process of considering the Mutual Security Act of
1957.

This is probably the most important foreign policy measure to be

considered each year by the Congress,
opportunit~r

It provides the Congress with an

to review the impact of the United States around the world.

It

gives the Congress an opportunity to question and to support, or reject,
foreign policy is sues throughout the world,
But who has the responsibility for presenting this program to the
Congress?

The presentation this year has been handled by the General

Counsel of the International Cooperation Administration.

Last year the

presentation was handled by a short-term employee of the International
Cooperation Administration.
They have done fine work,

I do not reflect on these men and their ability.

But I submit, Mr. President, that Congress

is as interested in foreign policy as the Secretary of State.

I submit that

just because the Secretary of States wants to relegate what he calls
11

ope'l'ations 11 to the outlying realms of the Executive Branch, Congress should

not be expected to accept trancated presentatinns of the foreign policies of the
Un{ted States: even when put forth by ab'!.e men from the operations coordinating facilities of tbe Executive Branch.

- 8 I do not insist that the Secretary of State drop his numerous
duties to sit with the Committees of Congress for days as they consider
the mutual security legislation,

But I do ask that the Department of State

assume its responsibility for the coordination of foreign policy,

I ask,

for example, that it take the initiative in bringing together the scattered
activities that have developed as the result of the generation of foreign
currencies in surplus disposal programs throughout the world,
The foreign policy of this nation can never become an effective
instrument to advance the national interest if we insist on administering
it on a blunderbuss, shotgun basis.
These conclusions are not based solely upon personal ob s·ervations
but are confirmed by numerous reports of my distinguished colleagues who
have examined our programs around the world,

The need for bringing these

programs closer within the State Department has been voiced by committees
of both the Senate and the House of Representatives as well as by private
agencies.
The Brookings Institution, in its report on the administrative
aspects of Foreign Assistance Programs, prepared for the Special Senat e
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, states pointedly:
The present tendency of the executive branch has been to
divorce the /State/ Department as far as possible from
operations, and to develop it only as a policy agency,
The transplanting of the International Cooperation Administration functions into the Department was largely the
result of Congressional pressure and was accepted only
with reluctance. Thus, many questions will remain
difficult to settle until there is more agreement on the
appropriate status and role of the Department of State,

- 9 The Special Senate Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program,
in its report o n May 13, 1957, states:
/The Com m ittee/ suggests that the Secretary of State
reexamine hi s position on this question with a view
to continuing c1.!:.d sp e eding of the process of integration of the Inte rnational Cooperation Administration
into the Department,
The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Overseas
Information Programs made on June 15: 19 53, stated with respect to the
then existing separate agencies:
The argument for sepa ..·ate agencies must be weighed
against the cost, the increas e d personnel and the dangers
of conflicting influences on foreign policy growing out
of separate programs .
The Subcommittee on Technical Assistance of the Senate Foreign
Rela tions Committee stated in its re;>ort on May 7, 1956 :
The subcommitt ee is not entirely satisfied with the
extent to which the International Cooperation Administration has been integrated with the Department of State • , •
It urges the Secretary of Statep who is the official primarily responoible~ to pursue the matter more vigorously.
The evidence would seem to contradict any possible belief that
the United States is now achieving its policy objectives by speaking with
many voices,

We are beginning to reap the consequences of innundating

the world with American personnel all bent upon diverse purposes.

The

recent anti-American riots in Formosa, whatever the justice of the incident,
indicate,

~'

the close relationship of every American activity abroad

to the attainment of policy objectives.

S e condly, the anti-American riots

indicate that, even in a country considered to be a staunch ally, there exists

-
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an underlying resentment that must have been simmering beneath the surface for some time.

It points to the conclusion that policy objectives might

better be achieved by a qualitative, integrated approach than through a massive
unleashing of a multitude of agency personnel.

In Japan current anti-Ameri-

canism is focused upon the Girard case involving the shooting of a Japanese
woman gathering scrap metal on a firing range.

The Japanese people are

aroused against the testing of nuclear weapons.

Before that it was against

the use of sacred Mount Fujiyama as a firing range for artillery.

Before

that it was isolated instances of non-conformance by American personnel.
Whatever the surface issue,

the underlying resentment is related to the

present multifarious, quantitative approach.

It points again

for lodging foreign operations within the Departmmt of State.
case in Japan is illustrative.

to the need
The Girard

Inconceivable as it may seem, instead of the

State Department initiating, administering, and controlling United States
operations, this case never reached Ambassador MacArthur but was referred to the Department of Defense in Washington.

From Korea, Thailand,

Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia come reports that the efforts of one agency
to build up the economy are being diluted by another policy respecting exchange rates on the dollar.

The government of Madras State in India

contends that tm Neiveli Lignite development program has been hold up for
three years while the plans have been shuttled between the I. C. A., the
State Department, the Bureau of Mines and the Patent Office.

From

Afghanistan and Iran are reports that present operations on the Helmand and
Karadj Dams are salvage operations based largely on earlier ill-conceived
actions of autonomous agencies.

.

.

.
...
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These cases could be elaborated,

They point to the conse-

quences of spec..:dng with rnany voices.
The Pres i dcc"t ha.s the power under the Reorganization Act and
the Mutual Security Act as amended to return the State Department to a
strong position of leadership in the conduct of the forei gn relations of the
United St::ttes.

I sugg e s t that it may well h e the sense of t!J.e Congress

that the Preside::tt assume the initiative to that end.

